NORMATIVE RETROACTIVITY
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*

When the Court interprets the Constitution to accord a new right to criminal offenders, the
question quickly becomes which prisoners might benefit from the new rule. The current retroactivity
doctrine relies on a confusing substance-procedure dichotomy. Drawn from Teague v. Lane, this
test often results in lower court splits on the retroactivity question. Recently, the Supreme Court
decided the question of retroactivity in two cases—Montgomery v. Louisiana and Welch v.
United States.
This Article rejects the substance-procedure dichotomy and offers a competing theoretical frame for
considering the question of retroactivity. Specifically, the Article develops the concept of “normative
retroactivity,” arguing that retroactivity should relate directly to the normative impact of the new
rule on previous guilt and sentencing determinations. Further, the article advances a doctrinal
test for assessing normative retroactivity of new rules of criminal constitutional law that combines
the normative impact of the rule with a balancing test that weighs the applicable values of
fundamental fairness and equality under the law against the competing values of finality, comity,
and government financial burden.
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The way to right wrongs is to shine the light of truth upon them.

—Ida R. Wells-Barnett

INTRODUCTION

When the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution to recognize a new
right for criminal defendants, the outcome seems to be a cause for
celebration for prisoners. The real question, though, is whether the
decision applies retroactively to those convicted and sentenced in the
1
manner now determined to be unconstitutional.
The Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida in January 2016 provides a recent
2
example of this kind of inquiry. In Hurst, the Court held that Florida’s
3
capital sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment. By allowing the
judge to determine whether the State had proved the aggravating facts
required to impose the death penalty, Florida’s law violated Hurst’s right to

1

2
3

Although initially the subject of skepticism concerning the ability and propriety of judges
to ‘make law,’ the retroactivity doctrine has been developed by the Court over the past
several decades. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69 (explaining that a
court’s duty is not to “pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one”).
But see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (marking the first in a line of cases
moving away from the court’s non-retroactivity doctrine).
136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
Id. Florida currently has 396 prisoners on death row, the second largest death row in the
United States behind California. Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.
(July 1, 2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-deathrow-year.
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4

a trial by jury. While Hurst no longer faces execution, it is not clear
whether the new constitutional rule will apply to others sentenced under the
5
same unconstitutional process. In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court
held that its death penalty was unconstitutional because it granted judges,
not juries, the ultimate decision-making power in capital cases, following the
6
holding in Hurst.
The Court applied the retroactivity doctrine in two cases in the October
7
2015 term, Montgomery v. Louisiana and Welch v. United States. In Montgomery,
the Court held that its prior decision in Miller v. Alabama applied
8
retroactively. Miller held in 2012 that mandatory juvenile life-without-parole
sentences violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
9
unusual punishments. The initial response of the states to the question of
whether Miller applied retroactively was inconsistent, leading to a split
10
among lower courts.
In Welch v. United States, the Court similarly held its decision in Johnson v.
11
United States applied retroactively.
Johnson held that the Armed Career
Criminals Act’s (“ACCA”) definition of “violent felony” was

4

5

6
7
8

9
10
11

136 S. Ct. at 622. See generally Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 495 (2000)
(establishing the Sixth Amendment rule with respect to statutory maximums); Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (applying the Apprendi rule to capital cases).
It appears that the decision in Hurst might apply retroactively, at least to cases in Florida.
The Florida Supreme Court has not ruled on the question, but it did stay an execution
scheduled for February 2, 2016. Mark Berman, Florida Supreme Court Halts Scheduled
Execution After Debate Over State’s Death Penalty, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/02/florida-supreme-court-haltsscheduled-execution-after-debate-over-states-death-penalty/.
Interestingly, the Hurst
decision did not stop Alabama, which has a similar system to Florida, from continuing to
execute offenders. Alabama executed Christopher Brooks on January 21, 2016, nine days
after the Court decided Hurst. The Court denied Brooks’s petition for a stay and writ of
certiorari. See Brooks v. Alabama, 136 S.Ct. 708 (2016) (denying petition for stay and writ
of certiorari to consider whether Hurst v. Florida applies to Alabama’s capital sentencing
scheme). Justice Stephen Breyer dissented and called more broadly for a re-examination
of the constitutionality of the death penalty. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The unfairness
inherent in treating this case differently from others which used similarly
unconstitutional procedures only underscores the need to reconsider the validity of
capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment.”).
State v. Rauf, No. 1509009858, 2016 WL 320094 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2016).
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257
(2016).
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736; see generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)
(holding that the mandatory imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment).
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725.
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016).
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12

unconstitutionally vague. Again, the question was whether, having received
an unconstitutional sentence, prisoners have a right to resentencing
13
through a retroactive application of the Court’s decision.
It is not enough, then, for the Supreme Court to hold that a particular
14
kind of criminal sentence or sentencing procedure is unconstitutional.
Rather, the question remains whether that decision applies to those already
serving such sentences—a retroactive application—or simply prohibits the
15
prospective imposition of such sentences in the future.
At face value, it is a travesty that offenders can remain in prison or even
be executed in cases where, if decided today, the imposition of that sentence
16
would violate their constitutional rights. This seems offensive both as a
matter of individual rights and as a matter of equal treatment under the
17
law.
And yet, the Court’s cases have generally disfavored the retroactive
application of constitutional decisions to criminal cases on collateral

12

13

14

15

16

17

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015). Specifically, the Court struck
down the residual clause of the definition of violent felony, which defined it to include a
crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.” Id. Without the “violent felony” enhancement, the statutory
maximum sentence is ten years, but with the enhancement, the statutory minimum is
fifteen years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2015).
There were strong arguments that Johnson should apply retroactively under the Court’s
doctrine. See Leah M. Litman, Residual Impact: Resentencing Implications Of Johnson’s
Potential Ruling On ACCA’s Constitutionality, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55, 60–63, 65–73
(2015) (discussing the potential effects of a Supreme Court ruling on Johnson following
certiorari but prior to oral argument); Leah M. Litman, Resentencing In The Shadow of
Johnson v. United States, 28 FED. SEN’G REP. 45, 47–49 (2015) (summarizing briefly the
Johnson ruling’s potential retroactive applications).
In theory, the Roman law principle of ubi jus ibi remedium (“where there is a right, there is
a remedy”) should control. See Ashby v. White [1703] 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 137 (U.K.)
(“[E]very man that is injured ought to have his recompense.”). From the Court’s
perspective, however, other values like finality and comity sometimes trump the
constitutional rights of inmates who have completed their direct appeals. See infra, Part
I.A.; see also Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (arguing for narrowing the application of new
constitutional rules to prisoners raising collateral challenges in habeas corpus).
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1059 (1997) (explaining the retroactivity inquiry and framing it as a study of legal
change).
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991) (addressing the potential
unfairness of non-retroactivity approaches to new constitutional rules by reframing the
inquiry in terms of constitutional remedies doctrine); David R. Dow, Teague and Death:
The Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
23 (1991) (exploring the unfairness of Teague in the death penalty context).
See, e.g., Stephen R. Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (1977) (exploring
theories of retroactivity, including fairness and equality, before arguing that the concept
of legal validity should determine the content of “retroactive law”).
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18

review. Several values compete with notions of fairness and equality under
the law. The first concern is that allowing retroactive application of newly
unearthed interpretations of the Constitution compromises the finality of
19
prior criminal proceedings. In addition, the cost of reopening cases serves
20
as a second deterrent to retroactive application of new constitutional rules.
Finally, where the application of such rules would require state governments
to retry or resentence cases, the value of comity—deference to state courts—
21
provides another reason to apply decisions prospectively.
The applicable rule with respect to retroactivity comes from Teague v.
22
Lane. In Teague, the Court declined to retroactively apply its holding in
23
Batson v. Kentucky, even though prosecutors had unconstitutionally used
18

19

20

21

22

23

See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 295–96 (1989) (affirming a line of cases forbidding
retroactive action of new precedents on collateral review of criminal convictions);
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622–40 (explaining the Warren Court’s nonretroactivity doctrine).
Teague, 489 U.S. at 309 (“Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a
conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to
the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived
of much of its deterrent effect.”). See also Bator, supra note 15; Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s
Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443 (2007) (arguing that Court’s
adoption of concepts of finality misreads the purposes of AEDPA); Andrew Chongseh
Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgments Less Final Can Further the “Interests of
Finality,” 2013 UTAH L. REV. 561 (2013) (arguing that “finality” is not an interest in itself,
but rather a collection of interests that can actually be harmed by refusing to grant postconviction relief).
Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (“In many ways the application of new rules to cases on collateral
review may be more intrusive than the enjoining of criminal prosecutions, for it
continually forces the States to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants
whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards.”); see also
Daniel E. Troy, Toward a Definition and Critique of Retroactivity, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1329 (2000)
(emphasizing economic costs as an argument against retroactivity).
Teague, 489 U.S. at 308 (“If a defendant fails to comply with state procedural rules and is
barred from litigating a particular constitutional claim in state court, the claim can be
considered on federal habeas only if the defendant shows cause for the default and actual
prejudice resulting therefrom.”); see also Bator, supra note 14; Kovarsky, supra note 19.
For a compelling argument against the value of comity, see Louise Weinberg, Against
Comity, 80 GEO. L. J. 53, 55 (1991) (“Reciprocal comity is not the appealing prescription
that it sounds, but instead, in implementation, is discriminatory and substantively
damaging to the rule of law”).
489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion). This rule is complimentary to the broader
statutory scheme created by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”). Pub. L. No 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254
(2006)). Specifically, AEDPA, section 2254(d)(1) limits habeas relief to state criminal
sentences to cases where the state proceeding “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that
was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. at § 2254(d)(1). But the AEDPA and
Teague inquiries are separate. Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (per curiam).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986).
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peremptory challenges to systematically eliminate black jurors during jury
24
selection. Despite the clear injustice, the Court held in Teague that the
values of finality and comity outweighed the value of fairness to the
25
individual defendant.
Teague decided that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure
26
generally did not apply retroactively, with two exceptions. First, if the rule
is substantive in nature, in that it places the conduct beyond the power of
27
the government to proscribe its limits, the Court applies it retroactively.
Second, if the rule is procedural in nature, the Court does not apply it
retroactively unless it is a “watershed rule” of criminal procedure, “implicit
28
in the concept of ordered liberty.”
Thus, under Teague, constitutional holdings apply retroactively only
when they are substantive; procedural outcomes generally do not fall under
29
the “watershed rule” exception. Certainly part of the rationale for this rule
was the Court’s belief that interests of finality and comity trumped the
30
concepts of fundamental fairness and individual rights.
Increasingly, the Teague test creates confusion for courts attempting to
31
determine retroactivity. As explained below, the line between substance
32
and procedure becomes blurred in many cases. Constitutional rules like

24
25

26
27
28
29
30
31

32

Teague, 489 U.S. at 296.
Id. at 308. The decision in Teague sparked a considerable literature with respect to
retroactivity. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Taking Justice to its Logical Extreme: A Comment on
Teague v. Lane, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2453, 2458 (1993) (arguing that “Teague subverts
congressional intent by achieving finality at the expense of all other values Congress
meant habeas to safeguard, including fairness and accuracy, even in capital cases”);
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 16 (addressing the potential unfairness of non-retroactivity
approaches to new constitutional rules); Joseph L. Hoffman, Retroactivity and the Great
Writ: How Congress Should Respond to Teague v. Lane, 1990 BYU L. REV. 183, 210 (favoring
a statutory approach to non-retroactivity doctrine); Linda Meyer, “Nothing We Say Matters”:
Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 424–25 (1994) (criticizing Teague on various
grounds, including the conceptual difficulties of connecting “newness” and “holdings”);
Kermit Roosevelt III, A Retroactivity Retrospective, with Thoughts for the Future: What the
Supreme Court Learned from Paul Mishkin, and What It Might, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1677, 1699–
1700 (2007) (considering the application of the retroactivity framework to a line of cases
under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)).
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311–12.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 311-12.
Id.
See id. at 308 (citing the “interests of comity and finality”).
The test’s shortcomings are well-documented. See, e.g., John Blume & William Pratt,
Understanding Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 326 (1991) (arguing
that Teague failed to make retroactivity outcomes more predictable); Kermit Rooosevelt
III, A Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L.
REV. 1075, 1113–15 (1999) (highlighting the difficulties of applying the Teague test).
See, e.g., 1 CHARLES FREDERIC CHAMBERLAYNE, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 171 (1911) (“[T]he distinction between substantive and procedural law is
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the one in Miller often have both substantive and procedural dimensions.
Further, the vagueness of the substance-procedure distinction allows lower
courts to respond to the determination of the Court based on other
considerations, including the lower court’s affinity (or disaffinity) for the
new rule, the rule’s effect on the court’s criminal population, the rule’s
potential impact on the court’s judicial resources, and the court’s level of
33
stigmatization of criminal offenders.
Also, the Teague test appears disconnected from the competing values in
34
this context—fairness and finality. The idea that procedural errors should
receive less scrutiny than substantive errors might be appealing in the
abstract, but it can lead to absurd results in practice, with respect to
35
retroactivity.
This Article rejects the substance-procedure dichotomy and offers a
competing theoretical frame for considering the question of retroactivity.
Specifically, the Article develops the concept of “normative retroactivity,”
arguing that retroactivity should relate directly to the normative impact of
the new rule on guilt and sentencing determinations. Further, the article
advances a doctrinal test for assessing normative retroactivity of new rules of
criminal constitutional law that combines the normative impact of the rule
with a balancing test that weighs the applicable values of fundamental
fairness and equality under the law against the competing values of finality,
comity, and financial burden.
Part I of the Article outlines the retroactivity problem—the imbalance of
the core values at stake and the inherent difficulty in applying the Teague
doctrine.
Part II proposes an alternative theoretical paradigm for
understanding and applying the concept of retroactivity—normative
retroactivity. Finally, in Part III, the Article describes the virtues of
normative retroactivity.

I. THE RETROACTIVITY PROBLEM
The application of the retroactivity doctrine of Teague has suffered from
two core problems. First, the doctrine has developed an inequity in

33
34

35

one not only of but little consequence; it is one which is principally based . . . on a mere
difference in the form of statement.”); Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure”
in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L. J. 333, 336 (1933) (finding the “alleged distinction”
between procedure and substance unsatisfactory to find differences in meaning).
See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 25 (criticizing vagueness of the Teague doctrine); Roosevelt,
supra note 25, at 1701(suggesting that Teague should be applied case-by-case).
See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 25, at 2554 (stating that Teague failed to meet its self-described
goals of fairness and finality); Blume & Pratt, supra note 31, at 354–56 (discussing Teague
and finality); Roosevelt, supra note 31.
Roosevelt, supra note 25, at 1693–98.
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balancing the competing interests at stake. For many years, the Court has
prioritized the interests of finality and comity over fairness and equality
under the law.
Equally troubling in the Court’s analysis of the question of retroactivity
has been the confusion created by employing a substance-procedure
dichotomy by which to assess retroactivity. Generally, new substantive rules
of constitutional law apply retroactively, and procedural rules do not, but
there is often disagreement about whether a rule is substantive or
procedural. This ambiguity results in lower court splits, and in many cases,
the Court must decide the retroactivity question.

A. The Competing Values of Retroactivity Analysis
1. Fundamental Fairness and Equality under the Law
In determining whether a constitutional rule should apply retroactively
to individuals convicted and sentenced prior to the adoption of that rule by
the Court, the Court has articulated a series of competing considerations.
Counseling in favor of retroactive applications are the concepts of
36
37
fundamental fairness and equality under the law.
When the Court determines, for instance, that a particular punishment
violates the constitutional rights of an individual, other offenders suffering
that same punishment have two reasons to object to its continued
imposition. First, the punishment is unfair in its own application—meaning
that the state punished the individual in a manner inconsistent with the
36

37

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (emphasizing that “selective application of
new rules violates the principles of treating similarly situated defendants the same”);
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 555–56 n.16 (1982) (“The problem is not merely
the appearance of inequity, but the actual inequity that results when the Court chooses
which of many similarly situated defendants should be the chance beneficiary of a
retroactively applied rule.”); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (“If a ‘new’ constitutional doctrine is truly right, we should not reverse lower
courts which have accepted it; nor should we affirm those which have rejected the very
arguments we have embraced.”); Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in
Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922, 987 (2006) (“All of these doctrines require selection of a
trigger point—a way of separating those who will benefit from a new decision from those
who will not—which will almost invariably make a claimant’s eligibility for relief depend
on something over which she had little, if any, control.”).
See Desist, 394 U.S. at 258–59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“We depart form the basic
judicial tradition when we simply pick and choose from among similarly situated
defendants those who alone will receive the benefit of a ‘new’ rule of constitutional
law.”); Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral Review,
91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 161 (2012) (“Society has an interest in seeing people sentenced
correctly in accordance with its laws. Allowing people to continue to serve years of extra
prison time despite a plain error in their sentence undermines the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system . . . .”).
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Constitution. Suppose an offender received a death sentence as a
punishment for a rape, but the Court had interpreted the Eighth
Amendment to prohibit capital sentences for rape because death was an
38
excessive sentence for rape. To impose a death sentence for rape would
then be fundamentally unfair because it violates the constitutional rights of
the offender.
Second, the punishment could be one that is unfair in that it is unequal
under the law. In this context, the punishment would be unfair by
comparison—the constitutional rule prohibited the imposition of the
punishment on one offender, but not the other, with the only difference
being when the state imposed the punishment. Using the same example, a
death sentence for a rape offense would violate conceptions of equality
under the law because no one going forward could receive that sentence for
that crime.
Another word about equality under the law is instructive. While disparity
in sentencing outcomes between offenders who commit essentially the same
conduct exists as an ordinary function of allowing discretion in sentencing,
such disparities become increasingly troubling as the severity of
punishments increases. Indeed, the disparity in capital sentencing outcomes
in the 1970s rose to such a level that it violated the Eighth Amendment’s
39
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.
Likewise, when the sentence is no longer available because it is
unconstitutional, the inequality under the law becomes more pronounced
than when it is simply the product of different exercises of discretion. As
explored below, the impact of the newly adopted constitutional rule bears
heavily on whether prospective application infringes upon, and to what
40
degree it infringes upon, conceptions of equality under the law.

2. Finality, Comity, and Financial Burdens
The Supreme Court has long trumpeted the value of finality in criminal
41
cases, particularly in the context of habeas corpus appeals. The concept of
38
39
40

41

See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (ruling that the death penalty is too harsh a
punishment for rape).
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam).
Note that the same fairness and rule of law concerns apply to procedural rights. In some
cases, denying procedural rights arising under the constitution in criminal cases can
create even more unfairness than the denial of substantive rights.
See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (“No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system,
not society as a whole is benefitted by a judgment providing a man shall tentatively go to
jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be
subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved.”); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S.
1, 24–25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Both the individual criminal defendant and
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finality embraces the value of a final judgment that settles a criminal
42
matter. Once a court has tried a case, found the defendant guilty, and
sentenced the defendant, the value of finality warns against upsetting that
43
judgment in all but the most extreme examples of injustice.
Implicit in the concept of finality is the assumption that the criminal trial
proceeding and sentencing were fair and accorded the defendant his
44
constitutional rights, giving him his day in court. Further, the assumption
includes the ideas that the process was legitimate, non-arbitrary, and
45
entailed the proof of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Perhaps most important, the concept of finality assumes the outcomes of the
criminal trial and sentencing proceeding were accurate, and thus require no
46
further review.
This presumption of accuracy, both as a matter of law and a matter of
policy, becomes even stronger after the courts have reviewed the
47
defendant’s direct appeals. On habeas appeal, the courts are generally

42

43

44

45

46

47

society have an interest in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that
comes with an end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused not on
whether a conviction was free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be
restored to a useful place in the community.”); Bator, supra note 14, at 471 (noting that
throughout history “[t]he essential touchstone continued to be that the writ of habeas
corpus was not to be used as a a writ of error, and that decisions of competent tribunals as
to issues of fact or law bearing on convictions should be final”).
See, e.g., Bator, supra note 14, at 452 (stating that a lack of finality can undermine the
functions of criminal law); Ryan W. Scott, In Defense of the Finality of Criminal Sentences on
Collateral Review, 4 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POLICY 179, 181 (2014) (defending the finality of
criminal sentences against challenges from recent scholarship).
See, e.g., Bator, supra note 14, at 452–53 (explaining the advantages of finality); Henry J.
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV.
142, 150 (1970) (stating that “conventional notions of finality” should have a place in
criminal litigation).
Kovarsky, supra note 19, at 454 (noting that “[s]ocial acceptance of final judgment
reflects the confidence in the institutions and procedures that produce it”); Ronald J.
Tabak, Finality Without Fairness: Why We are Moving Towards Moratoria on Executions, and the
Potential Abolition of Capital Punishment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 733, 737 (2001).
The adoption of AEDPA also contains echoes of this “full and fair” principle, such that
receiving a full and fair proceeding closes the door on future consideration of the merits.
See Claudia Wilner, “We Would Not Defer to that Which Did Not Exist”: AEDPA Meets the Silent
State Court Opinion, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1442, 1453 (2002) (noting that under AEDPA a
reviewing federal court must defer to the reasonable decisions of the state court).
Id.; see also Bator, supra note 14, at 450–51 (examining the link between finality and
legality); Kovarsky, supra note 19, at 454 (noting that “[s]ocial acceptance of final
judgment reflects the confidence in the institutions and procedures that produce it”).
See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259 (2005)
(emphasizing that nine years after AEDPA came into effect, no state had successfully
opted into the special capital case procedures that had been highlighted by AEDPA’s
drafters).
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reluctant to overturn a case based on substantive or procedural errors, based
48
largely on this notion of finality.
To demonstrate how ingrained finality has become, one need only to
examine the Court’s hesitancy to recognize a freestanding claim of actual
49
innocence. Even when the petitioner can prove his actual innocence of
the crime, courts may bar that claim based on the failure to satisfy certain
50
procedural requirements.
As such, the principle of finality discourages retroactive application of
new constitutional rules, particularly where such an application serves to
reopen a significant number of cases for retrial or resentencing. The notion
remains, barring extreme circumstances, that final judgments should remain
51
final.
A second, similar ground for deciding not to disturb final judgments is
the value of comity—deference of the federal government towards the
decisions of state governments and courts. Criminal law has traditionally
remained in the purview of states. Although Congress has federalized
certain areas—such as distribution of illegal drugs and corporate crimes—
the states still administer most of the criminal law in the United States. The
idea of comity counsels the Congress and the federal courts to defer to the
determinations and actions of the state legislatures and courts where
possible. Federal courts on habeas review, for instance, should accord a
high level of deference to the factual findings of state trial courts according
to the principles of comity. In the retroactivity context, constitutional
interpretations should not, according to principles of comity, serve to undo
52
a significant number of final criminal judgments of state courts.

48
49

50

51

52

Kovarsky, supra note 19; Wilner, supra note 45.
See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554–55 (2006) (illustrating the stringent standard which
must be satisfied to obtain an actual innocence exception); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
390 (1993) (holding that Defendant’s claim of actual innocence did not entitle him to
federal habeas relief); Robert Batey, Federal Habeas Corpus Relief and the Death Penalty:
“Finality with a Capital F”, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 252 (1984) (discussing the procedural
doctrines limiting the availability of habeas relief); George C. Thomas III et al., Is It Ever
Too Late for Innocence? Finality, Efficiency, and Claims of Innocence, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 263,
263–64 (2003) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s response to claims of actual innocence
and recommending a different response).
The Court has long expressed the worry, vastly overstated, of criminal defendants
“sandbagging” by not advancing their best claims at trial. See Graham Hughes,
Sandbagging Constitutional Rights: Federal Habeas Corpus and the Procedural Default Principle,
16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 321 (1987-88) (discussing procedural default in habeas
corpus claims).
See, e.g., Bator, supra note 14, at 450–51 (“[I]f a criminal judgment is ever to be final, the
notion of legality must at some point include the assignment of final competence to
determine legality.”); Friendly, supra note 43.
See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 25, at 2457 (“Teague is part of the larger fabric of habeas
decisions concerning successive petitions, procedural default, and deference to state
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A consequence of retroactive application of new constitutional rules—
the expenditure of state resources to retry or resentence cases—provides a
third argument against retroactivity. In some ways the combination of
finality and comity, this economic concern considers the degree to which a
retroactive application would result in a heavy financial burden upon the
states. Thus, the financial burden argument would challenge a court to
weigh the value of the fairness, including the likelihood of actually changing
the circumstances of convicted individuals, against the economic cost of re53
litigating these cases.

3. Weighing the Competing Values
At the heart of the analysis, then, are the values in favor of retroactive
application of new constitutional rules—fairness and equality under the
law—evaluated against the concerns of finality, comity, and economic
burden. Historically, the Court has erred on the side of the latter, creating a
presumption that new criminal constitutional rules should apply only
54
prospectively. As with finality more generally, inherent in this approach is
the assumption that criminal trials are fair, provide accurate determinations
as to guilt, and impose proportional and reasonable sentences.
As explored below, the impact of the constitutional rule, as well as the
likely consequences of retroactive application, bear heavily on this question
of balancing values. Too often, however, the Court has used difficult-toapply doctrinal distinctions to determine the question of retroactivity.
These approaches unfortunately obscure the balancing of values at stake,
and all too often simply declare finality as the end goal without considering
fairness.

B. The Doctrinal Confusion of Teague
Before exploring the Court’s retroactivity doctrine, it is instructive to
consider the different groups of offenders to whom retroactive application
might apply. When the Court decides a case, the first group of offenders to
consider are those whose cases are currently pending on direct appeal
(“direct appellees”). A second group will be petitioners making habeas

53

54

findings, all of which put a premium on avoiding excessive interference with state court
judgments.”).
See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (explaining that
“[e]xtending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders does not impose an onerous burden
on the States, nor does it disturb the finality of state convictions”).
Arguably, some of this tendency may be a vestige of the non-retroactivity approach of the
Warren Court. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622–28 (1965) (explaining the
Warren Court’s non-retroactivity doctrine).
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corpus claims, collateral challenges to the constitutionality of the process
55
that resulted in their punishment (“collateral appellees”).
Typically, a decision by the Supreme Court as to the constitutionality of a
56
particular criminal law or procedure applies to direct appellees.
The
retroactivity question, then, focuses on whether the decision applies to
collateral appellees. If the Court determines that the decision should only
apply prospectively, then collateral appellees become procedurally barred
from raising a constitutional challenge based on the new decision.
A second consideration is whether the rule is a new one, or simply an
57
application of established law.
Where the decision falls into the latter
category, the retroactivity bar does not apply, because the Supreme Court
decision did not create a new rule.
In such a situation, the applicable federal statute, the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) applies, at least when the case
58
involves a claim decided on the merits by a state court. Under section
2254(d)(1) of AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas relief if a state
merits adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
59
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .”
Thus, if the rule was an established provision of law, it applies to the
cases of collateral appellees because it was a rule in place at the time of their
trial and sentencing. And to receive a hearing on the merits, the petitioner
60
must overcome AEDPA’s procedural bar.

55

56

57

58
59
60

Technically, a third category of offenders consists of those that have exhausted their
collateral appeals and must make successive challenges to their sentence (“successive
appellees”). For purposes of this article successive appellees will be merged with
collateral appellees, putting aside the procedural thicket that AEDPA imposes on these
prisoners for another time.
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding “that a new rule for the conduct
of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal,
pending direct review or not yet final . . .”).
While the determination of whether a rule is “new” is often a difficult one, the Court
explained in Teague that “a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or
imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.” 489 U.S. 288, 301
(1989) (plurality opinion). Put differently, a case announces a new rule if “the result was
not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”
Id. But see Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to
Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 203, 257 (1998) (expressing doubts about whether the rule considered in Teague was a
“new” one).
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (2006)).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional
Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595, 607-08 (2009) (noting that judicial resource
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In addition to AEDPA, two barriers exist to the application of an old rule
of criminal law or procedure clarified by the Supreme Court. First,
collateral appellees must have, in most cases, preserved the particular claim
as part of their appeals. Failure to raise a claim based on an old rule of
criminal law or procedure can bar a collateral appellee or exhausted
appellee from raising it on appeal.
Second, the harmless error doctrine serves to block many appeals based
on clarifications of old criminal laws or procedures. Courts can determine
that, although the criminal law or procedure contained a constitutional flaw,
the result at trial and sentencing would have been the same, rendering the
error harmless and inconsequential. Appellate courts that trust in the state
criminal trial process rely heavily on the harmless error doctrine, particularly
on collateral appeals.

1. The Origins of the Doctrine
As a result of the many new criminal procedure rules adopted by the
Warren Court, questions arose concerning the application of those rules
61
62
with respect to petitioners with cases on appeal. In Linkletter v. Walker, the
Court considered whether the rule adopted in Mapp v. Ohio, which required
states to exclude evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
63
applied to cases on direct appeal at the time.
The Court in Linkletter recognized that the Court’s traditional practice
64
had been to apply its decisions in criminal cases prospectively. The reason
for this approach was the idea that the role of the Court was to interpret law,
65
not make it. The Court, however, continued its trend toward embracing
66
more realist and less formalist approaches to decision-making in Linkletter.

61

62
63
64

65

66

constraints create a de facto procedural bar, even though courts have discretion to reach
the merits on cases otherwise barred).
For an excellent discussion of the development of the law in this area, see BRANDON L.
GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: EXECUTIVE DETENTION AND POSTCONVICTION LITIGATION (2013).
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Linkletter, 281 U.S. at 619–20.
Linkletter, 318 U.S. at 622–23 (“At common law there was no authority for the proposition
that judicial decisions made law only for the future. Blackstone stated the rule that the
duty of the court was not to ‘pronounce a new rule of law, but to maintain and expound
the old one.’ This Court followed that rule [in past cases]. . . . The judge rather than
being the creator of the law was but its discoverer.”) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (arguing for the formalist approach of
discovering law, not making it); see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 1 (explaining that the
court’s duty is not to make new law).
Linkletter, 318 U.S. 618. During the 1930s and 1940s, however, the Supreme Court moved
away from legal formalism or classicism in a number of cases, moving toward a more
realist view of decision-making. See generally WILLIAM WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF
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Specifically, the Court held that to determine the retroactive application of a
rule, it must examine the “prior history of the rule in question, its purpose
and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its
67
In doing so, the Court determined that Mapp applied to
operation.”
prisoners whose cases were still on direct review, but not those whose cases
68
were final.
In the debate that followed Linkletter, two important concerns emerged
69
that justified the prospective application of new constitutional rules. First,
the retroactivity question gave justices skeptical about the new constitutional
70
rule a second venue to challenge, or at least limit, its application. Also, the
decision not to apply a new decision retroactively might make the new
constitutional rule more palatable to members of the Court, particularly
71
when the new rule was a disruptive one. In Mackey v. United States, for
instance, Justice John Marshall Harlan II called the prospective application
of new rules “a technique that provided an impetus . . . for the
implementation of long overdue reforms, which otherwise could not
72
practicably be effected.”
Soon, however, the Court began to rethink the Linkletter principle,
73
mostly based on the confusion resulting from its application.
Justice
Harlan, in particular, criticized Linkletter, and offered his own alternative
74
two-part analysis. He first argued that the Court should give retroactive

67
68
69

70

71
72
73
74

CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA 1886–1937 (1998) (tracing
the historical arc of classic legal thought in America).
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.
Id. at 627.
See generally, Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 16, at 1733–49 (1991)(discussing general theory
of constitutional remedies, arguing “new” law doctrines all raise issues best analyzed as
involving constitutional remedies); Paul J. Mishkin, Foreward: The High Court, the Great
Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 77–79 (1965) (arguing that
new decisions should always apply retroactively to decisions on direct appeal).
Mapp and Linkletter demonstrate this phenomenon, exposing the judicial discomfort with
widespread application of the exclusionary rule. Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) (forbidding state courts from admitting illegally obtained evidence in a criminal
case), with Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636–37 (recognizing that the breadth of Mapp made
retrospective application both unfeasible and unwarranted in light of the purpose of the
exclusionary rule). Likewise, Scalia’s dissent in Montgomery, for instance, exudes this type
of sentiment—that the initial decision was incorrect, and thus should be narrowed. See
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 744 (2016) (noting that the implicit difficulty in
administering the prior rule is exacerbated when it is applied retroactively).
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
Id. at 676 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (breaking from the Linkletter rule).
See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court’s subsequent decisions have changed the rule articulated in Linkletter);
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692–93 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing about the application of new procedural due process rules articulated by the
Court).
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effect to decisions that constitutionally prohibited the punishment of
75
Justice Harlan also asserted that the
previously-punishable conduct.
federal courts should give retroactive effect to newly-announced procedural
76
rules that were “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” While never
adopted during his time on the Court, Justice Harlan’s ideas influenced the
77
development of the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence.
In Griffith v.
78
Kentucky, the Court held that new rules applied to cases on direct review.
Following Justice Harlan, the Court reasoned that “the integrity of judicial
review” requires the application of the new rule to “all similar cases pending
79
on direct review.”
Then, in Teague v. United States, the Court again channeled Justice
Harlan’s ideas and adopted the current test for retroactivity for new rules of
80
criminal constitutional law with respect to cases on collateral review. In
Teague, the Court considered whether its decision in Batson v. Kentucky,
81
which prohibited racial discrimination in jury selection,
applied
82
retroactively to Teague’s case, which was on collateral review.
In holding that the Batson decision did not apply retroactively, the
83
plurality in Teague articulated a two-part test similar to Justice Harlan’s test.
Emphasizing that the application of new rules retroactively to cases on
collateral appeal should be narrow, the Court limited such application to
two situations. The new rule applied retroactively either where the new rule
made the conduct in question no longer criminal or where the new rule
84
involved procedures “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”
In
adopting this test, the Court emphasized the values of comity and finality
with respect to collateral appeals, noting the essential nature of both
85
concepts to operation of the criminal justice system.

75
76

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 693; see also Blume & Pratt, supra note 31, at 338 (“[O]ver time, changes in both
social capacity and the expectations held of the judicial system can ‘alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the
fairness of a particular conviction.”).
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 16; Hoffman, supra note 25.
Griffith, 479 U.S. 314; see also Mishkin, supra note 69 (making the argument eventually
adopted in Griffith).
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322–23.
Teague v. United States, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Teague, 489 U.S. at 294; Hoffman, supra note 25.
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311–13.
Id. at 311–13.
Id. at 308.
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2. The Application of the Doctrine
After Teague, the Court refined the two categories of exceptions, terming
86
the first one “substantive” and the second one “procedural.” Under the
substantive prong, the Court has held that certain new rules apply
retroactively to cases on collateral appeal because they forbade criminalizing
certain previously-criminal conduct or banned imposition of certain
87
punishments on certain classes of offenders.
The Court also has added the proviso that procedural rules do not apply
88
retroactively unless they are “watershed” rules of criminal procedure. The
Court, though, has rejected every claim since Teague that a particular
procedural rule fits the watershed category, as the rules in question have not
implicated the “fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal
89
proceeding”. It has explained that Gideon v. Wainwright, where the Court
held that state courts must provide all felony defendants with a lawyer, is an
example of a watershed rule, but has declined to find any other new
90
procedural rules as fitting the exception. Even in Crawford v. Washington,
where the Court broadened the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to prohibit the admission of hearsay statements without cross91
examination, the Court held that the new procedural rule did not meet the
92
“watershed” threshold.
For practical purposes, then, the substantive exception to the Teague bar
provides the only real opportunity for retroactive application of new rules of

86

87

88

89

90

91
92

See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 728–29 (2016) (noting Teague created an
exception from the general bar of retroactivity for “new substantive rules of constitutional
law” and new “watershed rules of criminal procedure” that raise issues of accuracy and
fundamental fairness).
Id. at 729–30. There are several examples of this kind of case. See, e.g., Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (barring capital sentencing of juvenile offenders);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional
because the Due Process Clause allows individuals to engage in consentual sexual
conduct “without intervention of the government”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321
(2002) (holding that offenders with mental retardation cannot receive death sentences).
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728, 730 (referring to “watershed procedural rules” as the
second Teague exception and explaining why changes in procedural rules do not
automatically trigger retroactive application).
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495
(1990)); see also Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007) (“[I]n the years since
Teague, we have rejected every claim that a new rule satisfied the requirements for
watershed status.”).
See, e.g., Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1996) (referring to the Gideon rule as a
“paradigmatic example” of the watershed rule exception); see generally Justin F. Marceau,
Gideon’s Shadow, 122 YALE L.J. 2482 (2013) (exploring the significance of Gideon more
generally).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004).
Whorton, 549 U.S. at 421.
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criminal constitutional law to cases on collateral appeal. As such, the
Court’s determination of whether a new rule is substantive or procedural
becomes paramount.

3. The Confusion Inherent in the Doctrine
Unfortunately, the distinction between substantive and procedural rules
93
is often unclear.
At the margins, one can certainly separate the two
94
concepts, despite their apparent fluidity. Rules that eliminate particular
95
crimes are clearly substantive. The decision in Lawrence v. Texas, which
decriminalized sodomy, provides a good example of an obvious substantive
96
rule.
Similarly, procedural rules that lack any doctrinal vestments and are
substance-neutral, as Jeremy Bentham defined procedure, are clearly
97
procedural under Teague.
Most procedural rules, however, have some
98
substantive component to them. While the procedure may still be simply a
means to an end, the underlying requirements impose substantive duties on
99
the litigants.
The Court’s recent decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana concerning the
retroactivity of its decision in Miller provides a clear example of the
confusion that arises from the substance-procedure dichotomy mandated by
100
Teague.
Miller held that mandatory life-without-parole (“LWOP”)

93

94

95

96
97

98
99
100

See generally sources cited supra note 32; D. Michael Risinger, “Substance” and “Procedure”
Revisited with Some Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of “Irrebuttable Presumptions”, 30
UCLA L. REV. 189, 189–90 (1982) (describing the history of the substance-procedure
distinction).
See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724–25 (1974)
(observing that “[w]e were all brought up on sophisticated talk about the fluidity of the
line between substance and procedure” but recognizing it is possible to give meaning to
each term); Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42
YALE L.J. 333, 337, 340–44 (1933) (explaining that the utility of the terms depends on the
meaning that one gives them); Risinger, supra note 93, at 204–09 (developing a
framework for defining “procedural” and “substantive”).
See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692–93 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in
judgments in part and dissenting in part) (stating that instances in which an individual is
convicted for constitutionally protected actions presents “the clearest instance where
finality interests should yield”).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
See 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY APPLIED TO ENGLISH
PRACTICE 477 (1827) (using the term “adjective” law as an idea separate from substantive
law); Risinger, supra note 93, at 205–06 (describing purely procedural law as being solely
concerned with “considerations of rational accuracy and time efficiency”).
See sources cited supra notes 32 and 93.
See Risinger, supra note 93, at 209–11 (exploring how procedural regulations often beget
substantive policies).
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
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sentences imposed on juvenile offenders constituted cruel and unusual
101
punishments in contravention of the Eighth Amendment.
The question, then, is whether the rule adopted in Miller is procedural or
substantive. The rule appears procedural in that it prohibits mandatory
LWOP sentences, with the remedy being the provision of a new sentencing
proceeding in which a judge can determine the appropriate sentence. The
constitutional error in Miller involved the identity of the decision-maker with
reference to the petitioner’s sentence, with the court, not the legislature,
102
being the constitutionally-mandated venue.
On the other hand, mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles constitute
103
a substantive category of sentence that the Constitution now prohibits.
Considered as a unitary concept, a mandatory LWOP sentence creates
constitutional infirmities because of the combination of the substantive
characteristics of the sentence (mandatory), the sentence (LWOP), and the
offender (a juvenile). The retroactivity question under Teague therefore
turns on whether the decision in Miller removed a substantive sentencing
option from the trial court’s purview or, alternatively, simply required an
additional procedure in cases involving juveniles.
In Montgomery, the Court held that the Miller decision was a substantive
104
one, relying heavily upon the precedents upon which Miller relied.
Miller
echoes two of the Court’s prior decisions in the capital context—Woodson v.
105
North Carolina, which banned mandatory death sentences, and Roper v.
106
107
Simmons, which banned the execution of juvenile offenders.
The latter clearly provides an example of a substantive decision in that it
108
removed death as a possible sentence for juvenile offenders. The former,
though, also was a substantive decision in the Court’s eyes because it did
more than simply ban mandatory death sentences; it required individualized

101
102
103
104
105
106
107

108

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
Id. at 2475 (holding that the judge or jury must be able to consider mitigating
circumstances before imposing the harshes possible penalty on juveniles).
Id. at 2483–84.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732–36.
428 U.S. 280 (1976).
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Both Woodson and Roper applied retroactively. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725–29; Sumner v.
Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 72, 72 n.2 (1987) (indicating that states uniformly applied Woodson
retroactively).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 578; see Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732–33 (explaining the rule from Roper
is substantive because it “goes beyond the manner of determining a defendant’s
sentence”); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329–30 (1989); Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (explaining that new constitutional rules limiting the types of
sentences that can be levied against certain classes of defendants are substantive in
nature).
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109

sentencing consideration. Thus, for the Court, the substantive component
of the sentencing decision with respect to juvenile offenders, and not just
the need to have the Court (and not the legislature) determine the sentence
in the first place, made the decision in Miller a substantive one, despite its
110
outcome requiring a new procedure in certain cases.
The potential for confusion concerning whether a certain court decision
applies retroactively based on the substance-procedure dichotomy is not just
an academic concern. Rather, a number of cases have resulted in circuit
splits and the finding of different outcomes with respect to whether a certain
111
new rule applies retroactively.
109

110

111

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)
(Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (plurality opinion) (holding mandatory imposition of
death penalty violative of the Eight Amendment); see Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455,
2467 (2012) (explaining that the Woodson court found mandatory impositions of the
death penalty unconstitutional because it prevented the defendant from introducing, and
the sentencing authority from considering, substantive evidence of factors).
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734–35 (emphasizing that because Miller rendered LWOP an
unconstitutional penalty to a class of criminals—“juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect
the transient immaturity of youth”—it announced a substantive rule of constitutional law,
regardless of the procedural component necessary to substantiate this substantive
guarantee).
See, e.g., Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1792 (2013) rev’g 683 F.3d 740 (6th Cir.
2012) (holding retroactive application of People v. Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d 276, 285 (Mich.
2001) (revoking “dimished capacity” defense based on that court’s first hearing of
statutory interpretation issue), violated the Due Process Clause); Chaidez v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 1103, 1106–07, 1113 (2013) (noting split among federal and state courts
regarding the retroactive application of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) before
adopting Seventh Circuit’s view that Padilla announced a new rule that does not have
retroactive effect); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 819 (2010) (declining to extend
retroactive rule allowing sentencing authority discretion to impose sentence below range
advised by the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual to judges
considering modifying sentences in statutorily outlined proceedings); Carr v. United
States, 560 U.S. 438, 444 (2010) (noting that there is a circuit split on how to interpret
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act to avoid ex post facto implications);
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 266–68 (2008) (mentioning that states were divided
on whether or not they could apply new rules of constitutional criminal procedure more
broadly than as laid out in Teague); Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 415 (2007)
(noting that the Ninth Circuit opinion that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004),
should apply retroactively conflicted with the decisions of every other federal circuit and
state supreme court that addressed the issue); Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 356
(2005) (citing diverging views amongst the Courts of Appeals over when the limitiation
period, during which a federal prisoner must file a motion to correct his or her sentence,
begins to run in cases where the Supreme Court has recognized a new right that is
retroactively applicable); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 354–55 (2004) (observing
that the Ninth Circuit’s determination that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), was a
new substantive rule because it reshaped the structure of the Arizona murder law directly
conflicted with a decision of the Arizona Supreme Court); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406,
409–10 (2004) (admonishing the Third Circuit for failing to complete Teague analysis
after accepting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that a case was
retroactively applicable).
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While the substance-procedure dichotomy may be clear at the margins,
in practice it creates significant doctrinal confusion and disparities in lower
courts such that the Supreme Court must determine the retroactivity
question. In essence, the Court often ends up hearing the same case twice
because it does not decide the retroactivity question during the initial
decision and the application of the Teague rule is unclear.
The lack of clarity of the Teague doctrinal rule concerning retroactivity
continues to plague litigants and courts alike based on its inherent
112
uncertainty.
The potential ambiguity arising from the substanceprocedure dichotomy also creates the opportunity for lower courts to align
113
the retroactivity question with their view of the new constitutional rule. If
lower courts favor the rule, they will be more likely to find the rule to be
substantive; if lower courts disfavor the rule, they will be more likely to find
114
the rule to be procedural.
Another problem with the substance-procedure dichotomy lies in its
disconnect with the competing values at stake. The underlying assumption
suggests that prospective application of substantive rules somehow evoke a
greater degree of unfairness than procedural rules. While this is sometimes
true, it is certainly not always the case. And even so, it undervalues
procedural rules and their potential for unfairness.
Likewise, it is not clear that finality becomes more important in cases
involving procedural errors than those involving substantive errors. It is
certainly possible that finding a substantive rule retroactive in some cases
could have a much more significant impact on the finality of cases than a
particular procedural rule would. The same is true for the value of comity.
Deferring to state courts may or may not be more appropriate in cases
involving new procedural rules as opposed to substantive ones.
Even worse, the substance-procedure dichotomy does not provide for a
direct weighing of these values. To be sure, the Court embraces or rejects
the applicable value post hoc depending on whether it chooses to apply a new
112

113

114

See Bandes, supra note 25, at 2455 (“However, Teague leads to unfairness on a much
grander scale. The decision merely succeeds in creating a new arbitrary category of
remediless prisoners: those whose cases happen to be on collateral, rather than direct,
review at the auspicious moment when the Court hands down a decision classified as ‘new
law.’ . . . [T]he Court’s goal of eliminating the unfair application of retroactivity rules is
virtually unattainable. The only way to eliminate all disparity would be to make every rule
completely retroactive.”) (citations omitted).
See Fisch, supra note 15, at 1083–84 (noting the argument that in deciding whether or not
to apply a rule retroactively courts often “disassociate” the applicability of the rule with
their desired outcome, and thus may decide that the parties are not entitled to the relief
the retroactive rule provides).
See id.; see also Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part) (commenting on the resultoriented considerations that initially motivated “retroactivity” doctrine).
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rule retroactively. But there is no obvious link between substantive rules or
procedural rules and the concepts the Court ought to balance in answering
the question of retroactivity.
Given the inherent flaws in the Teague test, demonstrated by the Court’s
recent history of granting certiorari to answer questions of retroactivity, this
Article endeavors to offer an alternative theoretical framework by which to
consider the concept of retroactivity.

II. NORMATIVE RETROACTIVITY
Instead of relying on the substance-procedure distinction, the concept of
normative retroactivity frames the retroactivity inquiry in terms of the
115
normative impact of the new constitutional rule at issue.
As explained
below, by framing the retroactivity question in terms of normative impact,
the competing values of fairness, equality under the law, finality, and comity
play a more significant role in the retroactivity determination.
In this context, normativity refers to the impact of the new rule, its
practical consequence with respect to criminal trials and/or sentencing. As
a general matter, the degree to which the Court ought to require state
courts to revisit final determinations on collateral review should relate
directly to the hardship the failure to do so would impose in terms of
116
fundamental fairness.

A. Cataloging Normative Impact
The adoption of a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure falls
into one of two broad categories: (1) a decision that bears on the trial
court’s determination of guilt or innocence, or (2) a decision that bears on
the sentencing determination.
In the guilt-innocence category, there is a spectrum of possible impacts
of a new constitutional rule. On one end of the spectrum lie the “easy”
retroactivity cases, where the Court has determined that criminalizing

115

116

It is important to note that the theory of normative retroactivity applies to the application
of the retroactivity question to cases on collateral appeal. As noted above, new rules
already apply to cases on direct appeal. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)
(holding that new rules “for the conduct of criminal prosecutions” apply retroactively,
regardless of whether or not they present a “clear break” from previous law); see also
Mishkin, supra note 69, at 77 (declaring that retroactive application of the new rule
established in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), to convictions not yet final was
“normal”).
See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 25, at 2465-66 (criticizing the Teague court for overreliance on
logic and lamenting that it was not more guided by fairness and justice).
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117

Clearly, individuals imprisoned
certain conduct violates the Constitution.
for conduct no longer deemed criminal should receive the benefit of
118
retroactive application of the new constitutional rule.
On the other end of the spectrum lie cases where the constitutional rule
tangentially impacts the evidence admitted during the guilt phase of the
trial, but not in a way likely to have any influence on the guilt determination.
Here, retroactivity seems less appropriate because its application would
119
result in the retrial of cases without changing the ultimate outcome.
In the sentencing context, a similar spectrum exists. Cases in which the
defendant received a sentence that the new rule makes unconstitutional
120
should receive a retroactive application.
By contrast, new rules that have
only a tangential effect on the sentencing determination should not have a
121
retroactive application.
Interestingly, the stakes seem higher on both sides of the value spectrum
in the guilt-innocence context.
Where a new constitutional rule’s
application would raise serious doubts about the offender’s innocence, the
122
fundamental fairness concern seems particularly high.
At the same time,
retrying the case imposes a significant burden on the state, in terms of

117
118

119
120

121

122

Obvious examples of this would include: Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691–93 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (commenting that new rules that render criminal statutes
regulating certain actions unconstitutional presents the clearest instance in which a rule
should apply retroactively).
See, e.g., Bator, supra note 14, at 526–28 (articulating that on collateral review in habeas
cases, federal courts should have the power to determine such errors harmless).
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding death penalty
unconstitutional for conviction on child rape charge where victim was not killed); Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding imposition of death sentence upon juvenile
offenders unconstitutional); Atkins, v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding sentencing
mentally disabled individuals to death unconstitutional).
Examples might include: Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (determining that the
Courts of Appeals should apply an “abuse of discretion” standard when reviewing a
District Court’s sentencing determination); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007)
(clarifying the steps required when a District Court determines an appropriate sentence
while treating the United States Sentencing Comission’s Guidelines Manual as advisory);
and Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (holding that the Courts of Appeals may
presume that a properly calculated sentence under the United States Sentencing
Comission’s Guidelines Manual is reasonable). But see Roosevelt, supra note 25, at 1702
(arguing for retroactive application of United State v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) on a
case-by-case basis in these types of cases).
Note that innocence here refers to innocence under the statute. Fourth Amendment
rules, for instance, that prohibit admission of facts into evidence, would bear directly on
guilt in this way, even though the defendant may have engaged in deviant conduct.

508

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:2

upsetting a final determination, ignoring comity considerations, and
123
increasing costs.
By contrast, the sentencing context seems less significant in terms of
both sets of values, unless the offender is challenging a death sentence or
124
125
life-without-parole sentence.
In non-death cases,
revisiting the
sentencing determination may adjust the sentence, but the indeterminacy of
the sentencing process itself makes a slightly longer sentence seem less
unfair than imprisoning an innocent offender.
Similarly, the values of finality and comity seem less offended by
resentencing an offender. Because most states have, at one time, had a
parole system, resentencing seems like much less of a burden than retrying a
case. Unlike a retrial, where evidence may have gone stale and witnesses
may be unavailable, a resentencing can make use of new information about
the offender’s time in prison, and is generally a much less procedurally
burdensome process.
In sum, the theoretical step taken by normative retroactivity shifts the
focus onto the degree to which the new rule affects guilt-innocence
determinations and sentencing determinations from the past, in the present,
and for the future. Where the impact is significant, retroactivity becomes
the favored outcome, largely because the impact magnifies the value of
unfairness while minimizing the value of finality.

B. The Normative Retroactivity Test
1. An Overview of the Test
The normative retroactivity test has two parts: the impact inquiry and the
balancing of values. As indicated above, its application differs depending on
whether the constitutional rule bears on the guilt-innocence determination
or sentencing determination.
With respect to the guilt-innocence determination, the impact inquiry
asks whether, and to what degree, the new constitutional rule would have
impacted the guilt-innocence determination at trial in the majority of cases
on collateral or successive review. At the extremes of the above-described
spectrum, the application is easy and does not require application of the
123
124

125

See Bator, supra note 14, at 451 (emphasizing that finality in a legal proceeding allows for
conservation of resources).
In many ways, these sentences are functional equivalents. William W. Berry III, More
Different than Life, Less Different than Death, 71 OHIO ST. L. J. 1109, 1123–24 (2010)
(exploring the similarities between sentences of death and life without parole).
William W. Berry III, Life-With-Hope Sentencing, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 1051, 1053–54 (2015)
(arguing that LWOP sentences should be considered to be in the same category if not
worse than death sentences).
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second question. Where the new constitutional rule decriminalizes the
conduct, the new rule applies retroactively. Where the new constitutional
rule has a de minimis impact on the guilt-innocence determinations, it does
not apply retroactively.
Most cases, however, will not fall into either “easy” category. In such
cases, the impact inquiry assesses whether the new rule has a significant
impact, a medium impact, or a minor impact on the guilt-innocence
determinations of cases on collateral appeal.
Having established where the case generally falls on the spectrum, the
normative retroactivity test then requires the balancing of retroactivity
126
values. In other words, the Court must weigh the interests of fundamental
fairness and equality under the law against the competing interests of
finality, comity, and financial burden of retrying cases. In this weighing,
however, the impact test should serve as a thumb on the scale in the
determination. Where the new constitutional rule has a significant impact
on the guilt-innocence determination, then the presumption should be in
favor of retroactivity. Where the new constitutional rule has only a de
minimis impact on the guilt-innocence determination, then the presumption
should be against retroactivity.
It is in the hard cases in the middle where the balancing part of the test
does the heavy lifting. In such cases, the Court should weigh the likelihood
that application of the rule would result in finding some petitioners
innocent against the economic cost, finality considerations, and comity
concerns of retrying these cases.
In the sentencing context, the normative retroactivity test has a similar
application. First, the Court must ask whether the new rule has a
meaningful impact on the sentence of the offender. As with the guiltinnocence determination, there are easy cases in the context of the
sentencing determination. Where a sentence would no longer be available
for particular conduct or a particular type of offender, the application of the
new rule should be retroactive. By contrast, where the new rule would have
only a de minimis impact on the sentencing outcome, the application of the
new rule should be prospective with respect to collateral appellees.
Where the impact test does not clearly answer the question, the Court
should ask whether the impact of the new rule on sentencing outcomes is
126

Clearly this is not an exact science, but is the kind of process that courts engage in all of
the time. See Charles Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court’s
Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755, 757 (1963) (explaining that when the Supreme
Court is considering a conflict between individual constitutional rights and an assertion
of governmental power it adjudicates by “weighing the competing interest”) (citation
omitted); Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585, 586 (1988)
(defining the “balancing test” as a method of adjudicating that allows judges to avoid
formalistic rules and, instead, balance the interests of the parties).
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significant, involving capital sentences, life sentences, or removing
mandatory sentences; meaningful; or minor. The Court should then apply
the same balancing test—weighing fairness and equality under the law
against finality and comity. Again, the impact test should serve as a thumb
on the scale. Where the effect of the new constitutional rule on sentencing
outcomes is significant, the presumption should be in favor of retroactivity.
Where the effect of the new constitutional rule on sentencing outcomes is
minor, the presumption should be against retroactivity.
As with the guilt-innocence determination, the hard cases use the
balancing test to provide clarity where the impact test cannot. So, where the
new rule has some meaningful effect on sentencing outcomes, but not a
drastic one, the balancing of the competing values will determine the
outcome. In such situations, the Court must weigh the likely length of
shortening sentences and the unfairness of choosing not to do so against the
costs of resentencing and the values of comity and finality.
Finally, it is possible in some rare cases that the new constitutional rule
will bear both on the guilt-innocence determination and the sentencing
determination. In such cases, the Court should apply the normative
retroactivity test to both determinations to assess whether the rule should
apply retroactivity in either, or perhaps both, contexts.

2. Application to Montgomery and Welch
To demonstrate the value of the normative retroactivity test, it is
instructive to explore how it might apply to Montgomery v. Louisiana and
127
Welch v. United States, the Court’s most recent retroactivity decisions.
As
discussed, the question in Montgomery was whether the Court’s new
constitutional rule adopted in Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively to cases
128
on collateral appeal.
The rule in Miller determined that the Eighth
Amendment barred the imposition of mandatory juvenile life-without-parole
129
sentences.
Lower courts split over the question of whether this rule was
substantive or procedural under Teague. In a narrow 6-3 decision, the Court
held that it applied retroactively because it articulated a substantive rule
130
under the Teague doctrine.
Under the normative retroactivity test, the first question would be to
determine whether the new rule impacted the guilt-innocence
determination, the sentencing determination, or both. Miller clearly

127
128
129
130

Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718
(2016).
See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725.
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
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restricts the sentence that states and federal courts can impose against
131
As a result, the sentencing part of the normative
juvenile offenders.
retroactivity test would apply.
A court would then apply the impact test to assess what impact applying
the sentence retroactively would have on sentencing outcomes. In Miller,
the sentence at issue—a mandatory LWOP sentence—is no longer
132
available. As a result, it looks like it falls into the category of “easy cases,”
where the new rule has removed a possible sentencing outcome. The result
would then be the retroactive application of the rule to all juveniles
sentenced with mandatory LWOP sentences.
One might argue, in line with the substance-procedure set of arguments
in Miller, that the sentence itself, life-without-parole, is still constitutionally
available, and the consequence of Miller is simply to restrict the manner of
its application. If one took this view under the normative retroactivity test,
the result would be the same. The impact of the new constitutional rule on
the sentencing process is significant—a resentencing could mean the
difference between a death-in-custody sentence and the possibility of having
some meaningful chance at life outside of prison.
Given that the impact of the new rule is clearly significant, there would
be a strong presumption in favor of retroactivity. The Court would balance
the competing values of fairness and equality under the law against finality,
comity, and cost, but would find in favor of retroactivity, particularly given
the thumb on the scale. The costs of resentencing, as indicated by Justice
Kennedy, could be minimal—the state court would simply need to provide
133
the opportunity for parole.
The unfairness of the LWOP sentence (with its own kind of finality)
would outweigh state interests in finality, as the consequence in most cases
would simply be to shorten the sentence or adopt a similar sentence with a
sentencing hearing. Comity is likewise a less important value in this
context—the consequence of dying in prison far outweighs the
inconvenience suffered by resentencing. Finally, the fairness considerations
are significant in this context. The United States is the only nation in the
world that imposes LWOP sentences on juvenile offenders.134 To require a
court to consider whether an offender should really receive this sentence,
instead of automatically apply it, seems a fair request.

131
132
133
134

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
Id.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
Saki Knafo, Here are All the Countries Where Children are Sentenced to Die in Prison,
HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Sept. 20, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/20/juvenile-life-withoutparole_n_3962983.html.
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In Welch v. United States, the Court faced an entirely different new rule of
135
constitutional law. The issue in Welch was whether the Court’s decision in
136
Johnson v. United States applied retroactively.
In Johnson, the Court held
that the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) was unconstitutionally vague
137
in violation of the Due Process clause.
The statute provided for a
mandatory minimum sentence for offenders who had received three violent
138
felonies. The constitutional defect rested in the vagueness residual clause,
which defined “violent felonies” to include any felony that “involves conduct
139
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”
Under the Teague test, the Court held that the new constitutional rule
140
was substantive.
First, it noted that the rule altered the lawful statutory
sentencing range for a crime, removing the availability of the mandatory
141
punishment under the statute as written.
Likewise, the Court explained
that the new rule invalidated an element of a criminal offense that required
142
the imposition of a mandatory sentence.
And yet, as with Miller, one can see why the Teague test might cause
confusion. The removal of a mandatory sentencing option typically does not
remove the availability of sentence itself. Those less inclined to apply
Johnson retroactively might argue that the constitutional rule simply altered
the procedure—that sentencing under the ACCA is now a judicial and not a
legislative determination. These arguments, however, carry less weight with
the ACCA in particular because, without the violent felony provision, the
143
statute imposes a ten-year statutory maximum on offenders.
Thus, the
consequence of the new constitutional rule is to replace a fifteen-year
statutory minimum with a ten-year statutory maximum, making the
144
determination appear substantive.
Applying the normative retroactivity test to Welch begins with the
question of whether the new constitutional rule impacts the question of
guilt-innocence or sentencing. The ACCA provision in question addresses a

135
136
137
138
139
140

141
142
143
144

See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264–65 (2016) (identifying the new rule laid
down in a previous decision).
Id. at 1264.
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015).
Id. at 2555.
Id.
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1260 (2016); see generally Leah M. Litman, Residual
Impact: Resentencing Implications of Johnson’s Potential Ruling on ACCA’s Constitutionality, 115
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55, 60–63, 65–73 (2015); Leah M. Litman, Resentencing in the
Shadow of Johnson v. United States, 28 FED. SEN’G REP. 45, 47 (2015).
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016).
Id.
18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a), (e) (2015).
Indeed, the DOJ agreed with the petitioner’s determination as to retroactivity. Welch v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 (2016).
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sentencing enhancement, not a question of guilt-innocence. Specifically,
Johnson’s new constitutional rule provides that a Court cannot impose a
mandatory sentence under the ACCA section in question because it is
145
unconstitutionally vague.
The normative retroactivity test would then assess the impact of the new
constitutional rule on sentencing. Because the new rule removes a possible
sentence from consideration—the fifteen-year mandatory minimum—and
replaces it with a ten-year statutory maximum, the case looks like it would
fall into the category of “easy cases,” and Johnson would apply retroactively.
Even if one did not place it in the category of easy cases, it is clear that the
impact of the new constitutional rule on criminal sentences would be
significant. The difference in the sentencing outcome would be at least five
years and, in many cases, a decade of time outside of prison. By replacing a
fifteen-year minimum with a ten-year maximum, many offenders might have
already served their sentence and would receive immediate release upon
retroactive application.
As a result of the impact of the new rule on sentencing outcomes, the
presumption would be in favor of retroactivity. Applying the competing
values would not upset this presumption. In some cases, the unfairness of a
sentencing enhancement that resulted in at least a 50% sentencing increase
based on an unconstitutionally vague provision is significant. The unfairness
might be less in other cases where the three felonies clearly involved violent
acts.
In terms of finality and costs of resentencing, though, the burden would
be insignificant. In many cases, the federal government could simply release
the offender, or manually change the sentence, lowering it to the statutory
maximum of ten years. As such, the resentencing proceedings would not
raise serious finality issues. Finally, the value of comity would not apply in
this case, as it involved federal, not state, sentencing.

C. When Fairness Should Trump Finality
The real problem with the application of the Teague doctrine rests in its
favoring of the principles of finality and comity over the values of
fundamental fairness and equality under the law. Indeed, under Teague, the
presumption remains strongly in favor of prospective application of new
constitutional rules to criminal cases on collateral appeal. As expressed in
Professor Paul Bator’s seminal article on the issue, the overall sentiment with
respect to state court criminal proceedings was that generally, such
145

See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015) (“[T]he residual clause
produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause
tolerates.”).
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procedures were full and fair, according criminal defendants adequate
146
process and consideration.
In the decades since Bator’s article and the Supreme Court’s embrace of
this set of assumptions concerning state criminal proceedings, a different
picture has emerged. The growing innocence movement suggests that state
procedures are replete with errors, constitutional and otherwise. The
availability of DNA evidence, new understandings of the fallibility of
147
eyewitness testimony, the discovery of sham expert testimony,
the
unreliability of forensic evidence procedures, the inappropriate conduct of
some police officers, and the widespread evidence of racial discrimination at
all levels of the criminal justice system, have all cast doubt on the degree to
148
which state court proceedings should receive any deference.
Indeed, in
capital cases, the error rate—the percentage of cases in which a
149
constitutional error occurs requiring a retrial—is almost seventy percent.
The sheer volume of injustice—over 1800 innocent people have served
time in prison—suggests that revisiting criminal trials and sentencing
150
determinations might be worth the effort in many cases. As to sentencing,
the mass incarceration epidemic likewise counsels in favor of revisiting
sentencing decisions. The United States currently incarcerates more people
than any nation in the history of the world, with almost 1 in 100 citizens
151
serving prison sentences.
Certainly, the Court’s over-emphasis on finality
in habeas cases and the Bureau of Prisons restrictions on compassionate
152
release have contributed to this epidemic.

146
147

148

149
150
151
152

Bator, supra note 14, at 450–51.
The FBI apparently faked an entire field of forensic science. See Dahlia Lithwick,
Pseudoscience in the Witness Box, SLATE.COM (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/04/fbi_s_flawed_forensics_expert_
testimony_hair_analysis_bite_marks_fingerprints.html (reporting on a decades-long
practice of submitting false testimony against criminal defendants).
See Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L. J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, iii–xii (2015)
(providing a non-exhaustive list casting into doubt the criminal justice system as
fundamentally just); see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756, 2759 (2015) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (“[D]espite the difficulty of investigating the circumstances surrounding an
execution for a crime that took place long ago, researchers have found convincing
evidence that, in the past three decades, innocent people have been
executed. . . . [T]here is significantly more research-based evidence today indicating that
courts sentence to death individuals who may well be actually innocent or whose
convictions (in the law’s view) do not warrant the death penalty’s application.”).
James S. Liebman, et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, 78 TEX.
L. REV. 1839, 1849–50 (1999).
See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/
Pages/browse.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (identifying over 1800 exonerations).
William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment Presumptions, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 67, 77 (2015).
See generally William W. Berry III, Extraordinary and Compelling: A Re-Examination of the
Justifications for Compassionate Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850 (2009).
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In light of this modern reality of errors and flaws persisting in the
criminal justice system, finality ought to receive much less weight than in the
past. When the chances are high that final determinations contain
constitutional errors, courts should not forego robust judicial review in the
name of finality.
The same is also true with comity. The volume of errors and mistakes in
state courts, the practices of many prosecutors, and the inherent conflicts of
interest that pervade the criminal justice system make the idea of comity
illusory. For the federal government to respect state court proceedings
when they follow basic rule of law principles is one thing; to stand idly by in
the name of comity in the face of widespread malfeasance is another.
Thus, while the values of comity and finality should remain part of the
calculus when assessing retroactivity, these ideas should no longer play the
dominant role they have played in denying collateral appellees relief.
Just as the status quo has diminished the ideas of finality and comity, it
has increased the weight that courts should accord to the concept of
fundamental fairness.
When the likelihood of unfairness is high,
investigating the circumstances present in a given case on appeal becomes
more justifiable. The retroactive application of new constitutional rules in
more cases would help to rectify this imbalance.
Such an approach would not be about simply releasing prisoners.
Rather, the idea would be to force state and federal criminal justice
institutions to reduce the substantive and procedural errors inherent in the
administration of criminal justice.
In particular, the value of fairness should trump economic costs when
the stakes are highest for the prisoner. Where the impact on the question of
innocence or on the sentencing determination is significant, fairness should
prevail. The cost of failing to accord prisoners human rights far outweighs
the economic costs of remedying earlier errors or malfeasance.

III. THE VIRTUES OF NORMATIVE RETROACTIVITY
Having described the normative retroactivity test and demonstrated its
possible application to the retroactivity question, the Article concludes by
making the case for its adoption as a substitute for the Teague rule. The
central advantages of this approach to retroactivity include: (1) abandoning
the confusion of the substance-procedure dichotomy of Teague, (2)
undermining the flawed finality presumption, (3) preserving judicial
resources, and (4) creating a greater connection between the practical
application of the retroactivity doctrine and its theoretical underpinnings.
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A. Abandoning the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy
The Teague doctrine, as explained, has created confusion in its
153
application.
Specifically, the substance-procedure dichotomy has proved
difficult to apply. At the heart of this confusion is the idea that almost all
procedural rules have some substantive component. As a result, it is often
difficult to determine whether to treat the rule as substantive, on account of
its substantive component, or as procedural, because at its core it simply
requires a certain procedure.
The trouble with the Teague doctrine goes further, however, in that the
concepts of substance and procedure have no direct connection to the
concept of retroactivity. As discussed above, it presumes that substantive
rules establish rights that deserve retroactive application more than rights
154
that arise from new procedural rules.
Fundamental fairness does not hinge on whether a rule is substantive or
procedural; neither does the concept of finality. A procedural rule may
have a more significant impact on the question of fairness than a substantive
one. Likewise, as seen in the sentencing context, finality often can be far
more offended by the application of a new substantive rule than a
procedural rule.
One benefit, then, of the normative approach to retroactivity is that it
abandons the substance-procedure dichotomy. Instead, the normative
approach focuses, as demonstrated, on the direct effect of the rule. By using
the impact- and value-balancing aspects of the normative retroactivity test,
courts can avoid the confusion of the substance-procedure dichotomy.
Neither of these tests rely on a determination of substance versus
procedure. Instead, these tests eschew such a determination in favor of
exploring the impact of the new rule, as well as weighing the competing
interests at stake.

B. Undermining the Flawed Finality Presumption
Under the Teague test, the overall presumption is in favor of prospective
application. The Court’s idea, as explained above, is that finality is the most
important of the applicable values in the retroactivity determination.
Indeed, the bright-line principle that exists mandates applying new criminal
constitutional rules prospectively unless the petitioner can demonstrate the
substantive exception.
The current flawed state of criminal justice administration demonstrates
why the Court should abandon this presumption. The frequency of error
153
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and injustice, both in the high number of innocent offenders with
convictions and in the imposition of excessive prison sentences, counsel
against resting the retroactivity decision so heavily on the finality principle.
Rather, devaluing finality has the consequence of creating the opportunity
to remedy injustice in a deliberate and proportional way. Remember that
retroactive application of rules enables the courts to explore whether an
injustice has occurred. It does not necessarily mean that the petitioner will
receive relief.
Under the normative retroactivity test, the concept of finality still plays a
role in the retroactivity determination, but in a more balanced, principled
way. The impact test ensures that the concept of finality will not trump
fundamental fairness and justice at all costs, as it seemingly does in many
applications of the current Teague rule. Instead, the balancing test
incorporates the principle of finality in light of the impact of the
constitutional rule, allowing its application to bar unnecessary review of
cases on collateral appeal without preventing courts from remedying
injustices.

C. Preserving Judicial Resources
Another value of the normative retroactivity test might be the
preservation of judicial resources. With a number of new constitutional
criminal law determinations in recent years, the Supreme Court has often
needed to decide a second case to determine the retroactivity of the new
155
rule.
When there is confusion concerning whether a new rule applies
retroactively, the Supreme Court then must make a second determination
(beyond the initial merits decision) with respect to a particular case. Given
that the Court elects to hear less than 100 cases per term, the allocation of
resources to determine retroactivity is a significant one.
The more significant use of resources occurs in the lower courts,
however, where courts litigate the retroactivity issue. The lack of clarity of
the Teague standard means that there is often widespread litigation with the
adoption of a new rule, even in cases where the courts decide that the
proper application of the new rule is prospective.
The normative retroactivity test offers more predictability than the
Teague test does. While the court will need to litigate the hard cases
(described above), the normative retroactivity provides clear guidance in
many cases such that the lower court does not need to engage in lengthy
analysis. Further, the applicable indicia—the impact of the case—rests upon
155
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objective indicia, which will then provide clarity in the framing of the
retroactivity determination.

D. Connecting Theory to Practice
The best argument, however, for the adoption of the normative
retroactivity test remains its connection to the core principles that underlie
the concept of retroactivity as applied to cases on collateral appeal. Unlike
the Teague test, the normative retroactivity test utilizes the potential impact
of the retroactive application and its relationship to the values at stake to
determine whether a new rule applies retroactively.
The normative theory understands the retroactivity question as one that
concerns the practical impact of its application.
Where the new
constitutional rule has a wide bearing on the likely innocence of offenders
or the disproportionality of their sentences, the application should be
retroactive because the potential for unfairness is high. The value of
fairness, then, guides the application of the retroactivity principle. Similarly,
when the impact is likely to be minimal as to the guilt-innocence or
sentencing outcomes, the new rule should not apply retroactively. Here, the
value of finality relates directly to the minimal nature of the impact of the
sentence.
The practical decision—the retroactivity question—thus stems directly
from the impact of the new rule. In doing so, the competing principles of
fairness and finality, embedded in the idea of impact, influence the
retroactivity decision. Where the impact is unclear, these theoretical
principles play a determinative role. The court must balance these
competing considerations to assess retroactivity.
The theory inherent in the idea of retroactivity therefore guides its
application to new rules of criminal constitutional law. As such, the
retroactivity determination does not rely on arbitrary distinctions
concerning procedure and substance. Instead the presence (or absence) of
the reasons to grant (or deny) retroactive application serves to guide its
application under the normative retroactivity approach.

CONCLUSION
In light of the Court’s recent decisions in Montgomery and Welch, and the
question of the application of Hurst to Florida and Alabama death cases, this
Article has sought to explore the current application of the Teague
retroactivity doctrine by the Supreme Court. The Article has first argued for
the adoption of a different paradigm in light of the confusion inherent in
the substance-procedure dichotomy that exists at the center of the Teague
inquiry. Specifically, the Article has advocated the adoption of a normative
retroactivity approach, where the impact of the new constitutional rule, as
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well as the competing underlying values of retroactivity determine the
application of the new constitutional rule to cases on collateral appeal.

